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STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION: THE
EXTENT OF THE STATES' RIGHTS IN
THE CREATION OF CONTROL SHARE
ACQUISITION STATUTES
by Mark S. Howard
N recent years corporate America has experienced an evolution that has
changed the thinking of both management and shareholders. Increasing
shareholder wealth appears to have a greater emphasis today than in the
past. Takeover activity has increased significantly throughout the last
twenty-five years. Congress reacted to the evolution of takeover related in-
vestment by passing legislation in 1968 designed to protect investors and put
the target company and the offeror on an equal footing.' Because the states
felt that the federal legislation was inadequate, state legislators attempted to
regulate takeover activity under their respective corporate laws. Litigation
regarding the constitutionality of these statutes increases daily. Last year
the United States Supreme Court held an Indiana anti-takeover statute con-
stitutional.2 This ruling triggered many states to enact takeover legislation
that may exceed the bounds of constitutionality. 3
1. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
2. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67, 88
(1987).
3. The following eleven states have enacted takeover legislation since the Supreme Court
decision in CTS: Arizona, Act approved July 22, 1987, ch. 3, 1987 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 3d Spec.
Sess. 32 (West) (codified as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-028, 10-1201 to -1204,
10-1211 to -1217, 10-1221 to -1223 (Supp. 1987)); Delaware, Act effective Feb. 2, 1988, § 203,
66 Del. Laws 204 (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203); Florida, Act effective July
2, 1987, ch. 87-257, 1987 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 517 (West) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 607.108-. 110, 607.244, 607.247 (West Supp. 1988)); Idaho, Control Share Acquisition
Act, ch. 84, § 2, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 147 (codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1601 to -1614
(Supp. 1988)); Louisiana, Act effective June 11, 1987, No. 62, 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 20
(West) (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135-:140.2, 12:51(C), 12:75(A)
(West Supp. 1988)); Massachusetts, Act approved July 21, 1987, ch. 272, 1987 Mass. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 200 (Law. Co-op.) (codified as amended at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I OD, §§ 1-8
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)); Minnesota, Act effective June 1, 1987, ch. 1, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv., 1st Spec. Sess. 911 (West) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01,
302A.011, 302A.251, 302A.255, 302A.433, 302A.553, 302A.671-.673 (West Supp. 1988));
Missouri, Act approved Aug. 11, 1987, No. 349, § A, 1987 Mo. Legis. Serv. 449 (Vernon)
(codified as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, 351.407 (West Supp. 1988); Nevada, Act
approved June 6, 1987, ch. 327, 1987 NEV. STAT. 755 (codified as amended at NEV. REV.
STAT §§ 78.378-.3793 (1987)); North Carolina, The North Carolina Control Share Acquisition
Act, ch. 182, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 48 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98
(1987 Supp.)); Oklahoma, Act effective June 24, 1987, Ch. 146, 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 639
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This Comment analyzes the extent to which states may enact control
share takeover legislation. The first section provides background informa-
tion regarding federal legislation governing corporate acquisitions. The sec-
ond section presents a brief history of state takeover legislation through
three different stages. The third section specifically addresses control share
acquisition statutes, including an analysis of the Supreme Court's ruling in
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.4 The fourth section proposes a
solution that provides for federal takeover legislation superseding much cur-
rent state takeover legislation, while leaving to the states the limited role of
enforcing the enacted federal legislation.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Litigants attack state takeover regulation daily in lawsuits filed in the fed-
eral courts alleging conflicts with the United States Constitution. Opposi-
tion to the state statutes centers upon two constitutional grounds. First,
opponents challenge whether the Williams Act,5 an amendment to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,6 should supersede state takeover legislation
based on the supremacy clause of the Constitution.7 Second, opponents
claim that state takeover legislation inhibits the exchange of shares in a na-
tional securities market in violation of the commerce clause.8 For a state
takeover statute to stand, it must surmount these two constitutional
challenges.
A. The Williams Act and the Supremacy Clause
1. The Williams Act
In 1968 Congress enacted the Williams Act9 in an attempt to provide in-
vestor protection.' 0 In addition, the Act strives to provide a balance be-
(West) (codified at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1988); Utah, Control
Share Acquisitions Act (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to -12 (1988 Supp.)).
4. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1987).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
6. Id. §§ 78a-78kk. The Act primarily addresses the secondary distribution of securities.
The Act requires registration of securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
§ 781. In addition, the Act grants authority to the SEC to regulate securities markets. Id.
§ 78d.
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The supremacy clause states that federal laws will supersede conflicting state laws. Id.; see
infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause grants the power to Congress
"[T]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." Id.; see infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
9. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1982)).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
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tween tender offerors and the target company. 1  By increasing disclosure
requirements to both the public and the management of the target company,
the Act requires tender offerors to provide sufficient information to share-
holders so they can make educated decisions regarding whether to tender
their shares. 12
The Williams Act covers three different situations.' 3 First, the Act ap-
plies to the investor or group of investors attempting to acquire control of a
corporation through a tender offer. 14 Second, the Act pertains to the inves-
tor or group of investors attempting to acquire control of a corporation
through open market or privately negotiated purchases. 15 Third, the Act
applies to a corporation that wishes to repurchase its own stock.16 Two cir-
cumstances activate the Act's requirement that purchasers disclose addi-
tional information. The first is when the investor acquires securities in a
corporation such that the investor's ownership interest in the corporation
exceeds five percent of the class of stock acquired. 17 At that point the Act
requires the investor or investors to send a statement to the issuer, the stock
exchange on which the corporation's shares are traded, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission).18 This statement
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811. The stated purpose of the bill, referred to as S. 510, reads as
follows:
S. 510 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring the disclo-
sure of pertinent information and would afford other protections to stockholders
(1) when a person or group of persons seeks to acquire a substantial block of
equity securities of a corporation by a cash tender offer, alternately called a
"takeover bid" .....
Id.
11. Id. at 2813 ("The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of man-
agement or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.").
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1982).
13. Note, The Continuing Validity of State Takeover Statutes-A Limited Third Genera-
tion, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 412, 413 (1987). The Williams Act applies to all securities
registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1982). Section 12 requires registra-
tion of all companies with over five million dollars in assets. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1987).
The 1934 Act also requires registration of all companies with over 500 shareholders of a class
of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). Although neither the Williams Act nor the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 defines the term "tender offer," the following definition exists:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons
to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of
securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified
terms for cash [cash tender offer] and/or securities [exchange offer].
E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for Corporate Control 70 (1973).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 78m(d)(1). The statute states its purpose within its language:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial owner-
ship of any equity security of a class ... is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such
acquisition, send to the issuer of the security ... send to each exchange where
the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing such
of the following information, and such additional information, as the Commis-
sion may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the




should include the background of all investors, 19 the investors' source of
funds,20 and any subsequent plans to liquidate, merge, or make any other
major change in its corporate structure.21 The statement should also contain
the number of shares owned by each investor,22 and any information regard-
ing contracts, arrangements, or understandings with anyone regarding the
target corporation's securities. 23
The other situation triggering the Act concerns the investor who makes a
tender offer such that after the purchase of shares pursuant to the offer the
investor owns more than five percent of the class of equity securities ac-
quired. 24 In this situation the investor must file a statement with the SEC
containing information necessary in the public interest to protect investors. 25
The investor must send this statement simultaneously with the copies of the
tender offer that are sent to the shareholders. 26
Other aspects of the Act include time provisions designed to protect inves-
tors against fraudulent acts as well as unreasonable delay. Tender offerors
must keep their offers open for a minimum of twenty business days. 27 Share-
holders who deposit their shares in response to tender offers may withdraw
their shares at any time while the offer remains open, 28 provided the share-
19. Id. § 78m(d)(l)(A) (requires "the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship
of, and the nature of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom
or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected").
20. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B). If the purchaser borrows funds to acquire, hold, or trade a secur-
ity, he must disclose the nature of the transaction and the names of the parties involved. The
only exception involves a loan received from a bank in the ordinary course of business. The
purchaser may request in his statement that the Commission withhold the identity of the bank
from the public. Id.
21. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
22. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D) (requires disclosure of "the number of shares of such security
which are beneficially owned, and the number of shares concerning which there is a right to
acquire, directly or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person,
giving the background, identity, residence, and citizenship of each such associate").
23. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(E). This section requires very broad disclosure regarding any infor-
mation involving:
[T]ransfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option agreements,
puts or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits,
division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the
persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been
entered into, and giving the details thereof.
Id.
24. Id. § 78n(d)(l). This provision parallels that of the investor acquiring more than 5%
found in id. § 78m(d)(1):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly.., to make a tender
offer for ... any class of equity security ... if, after consummation thereof, such
person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per
centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or invita-
tion are first published or sent or given to security holders such person has filed
with the Commission a statement containing such of the information ... as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78n(d)(1).
25. Id. § 78n(d)(1).
26. Id.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1988) (time period begins the date the "offer is first pub-
lished or sent or given to security holders").
28. Id. § 240.14d-7(a).
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holder submits a written notice of withdrawal. 29 Shareholders may also
withdraw their deposited shares any time after sixty days from the date of
the original tender offer if the offeror has not purchased the tendered
shares. 30 In addition, if more shareholders deposit their shares in response
to a tender offer than the offeror is bound or willing to pay for, then the
offeror must purchase the shares on a pro rata basis. 31 This provides an
equal opportunity for shareholders to tender their shares, and does not place
pressure on shareholders to make hasty decisions. All tendering sharehold-
ers must receive the same purchase price. 32 This is a particularly important
feature of the Act. If a tender offeror changes the offered price during the
pendency of the offer, all tendering shareholders must receive the highest
consideration offered. 33
Congress intended the Williams Act to assist both sides of the takeover
process. The Act attempted to give shareholders significant information and
protection in arriving at the proper decision while preventing unreasonable
delays by setting time limits on both shareholders and target management.
The ultimate intent was to protect shareholders by taking the element of
surprise out of the takeover process.
2. Supremacy Clause
Opponents of state takeover statutes argue that where such statutes con-
flict with the terms of the Williams Act, the statutes violate the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution. 34 As a result, opponents argue that
the Williams Act preempts state statutes that conflict with a goal of the Act:
to strike a balance between the offeror and the target management. 35 Most
state statutes strongly favor incumbent management and are often designed
to protect a particular corporation facing a hostile takeover. 36 The Supreme
29. Id. § 240.14d-7(b) (written notice must include "the name(s) of the tendering stock-
holder(s), the number or amount of the securities to be withdrawn and the name(s) in which
the certificate(s) is (are) registered, if different from that of the tendering security holder(s)").
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
31. Id. § 78n(d)(6) (also applies to securities deposited within 10 days after notice of an
increase in the consideration offered to shareholders).
32. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see supra note 7; see also Siamas, Can States Curb Tender
Offers?, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 80 ("The supremacy clause is at issue because the Williams
Act, a set of 1968 amendments to the Securities Act of 1934, was passed to bring takeover
offers within the disclosure requirements imposed on the purchase and sale of securities.").
35. Siamas, supra note 34, at 80 ("The disclosure function of the Williams Act is designed
to put management and the tender offeror on an equal footing."); see supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text; see also Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 437 (N.D.
Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The district court held that the Williams Act
preempted an Idaho takeover statute. 439 F. Supp. at 437. The court stated that the statute
ruined "the careful balance struck in the Williams Act between the offeror and the manage-
ment of the target company designed to protect the interests of the shareholders." Id. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions on the basis of improper venue. 443 U.S.
at 187. The majority opinion did not address questions regarding the constitutionality of the
state statute under the Williams Act. Id. at 190-91 (White, J., dissenting).
36. Cahan, Foust & Spragins, States vs. Raiders: Will Washington Step In?, Bus. WK.,
1988]
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Court recently emphasized that the Williams Act does not preempt all state
takeover legislation, just the legislation that upsets the balance between the
offeror and target management as provided for by the Williams Act. 37
B. The Commerce Clause
Many courts have struck down state anti-takeover statutes on the grounds
that the statutes violate the commerce clause.38 The commerce clause of the
United States Constitution simply states that Congress has the express au-
thority to regulate commerce. 39 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 40 the Supreme
Court developed a standard to determine the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute under the commerce clause. 4' If the burdens of the state statute imposed
on the exchange of securities between shareholders exceed the local benefits
of shareholder protection and the corporation's regulation of internal affairs,
then courts implementing the Pike standard strike down the statute as a
violation of the commerce clause.42
The effects of anti-takeover statutes on interstate commerce cannot be de-
termined until a large number of states implement such legislation. At that
point tender offers will likely decrease, and incumbent management will
again settle into its position, leaving investors to incur the stifling impact
these statutes will have on their ability to trade in a national securities
market. 43
Aug. 31, 1987, at 56; see Kilman, Dayton Hudson Expected to Get Minnesota's Aid, Wall St. J.,
June 23, 1987, at 12, col. 1 (Dayton Hudson Corp., a Minnesota retailer, sought aid in defend-
ing a takeover attempt by Dart Group Corp. by asking the Minnesota Legislature to pass anti-
takeover legislation that would strongly discourage takeover attempts).
37. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67, 78
(1987). The court declared that a state statute is preempted only "where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
38. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1426 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act violated commerce clause because statute unreasonably re-
stricted interstate transactions for corporate securities); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan Take-Overs Act imposed unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Haw. 1986)
(Hawaii statute declared invalid due to its direct burden on interstate commerce); Icahn v.
Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1417-18 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri Control Share Acquisition
Statute violated both commerce clause and supremacy clause).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see supra note 8.
40. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Arizona stat-
ute that prohibited grower of produce to transport uncrated produce from Arizona to Califor-
nia for packing and processing. Id. at 146. The statute was designed to motivate the growers
to build packing facilities in Arizona. The Court ruled that the statute created an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce. Id.
41. Id. at 142. "Where the statute regulates even handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effect on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits." Id.
42. See supra note 38.
43. See Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Com-
ment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97 (1987).
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II. HISTORY OF STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
After Congress enacted the Williams Act, states immediately began to
pass legislation that far exceeded the provisions of the federal legislation.
Thirty-six states enacted takeover legislation during the fifteen-year period
following the enactment of the Act.44 This first generation of takeover legis-
lation contained three main features. First, most of these statutes contained
a provision that required a filing with the secretary of state twenty days
before a tender offer officially commenced.45 This provision allowed target
management additional time to prepare defensive mechanisms to fend off a
hostile takeover, including distribution of information to shareholders re-
garding the upcoming offer.46 Tender offerors could not provide any infor-
mation to shareholders during this period of time.47 Second, the secretary of
state had the ability to call a hearing to determine the fairness of the offer. 48
This caused delay, which again benefited target management by providing
additional time to prepare defenses to the offer. Third, a state commissioner
held the right to deny the tender offer if the commissioner believed the offer
was simply inequitable. 49
In 1982 the Supreme Court finally ruled on the constitutionality of these
state statutes. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.50 the Supreme Court held that the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act 51 violated the commerce clause by placing
too heavy a burden on interstate commerce.52 The Court used the balancing
test articulated in Pike to determine whether the Illinois act violated the
commerce clause. 53 Using the Pike test, the Court determined that the ad-
ded protection to shareholders did not outweigh the burdens imposed on
interstate commerce. 54 As a result, the Court struck down the statute on
commerce clause grounds.55 This decision marked the end of the first gener-
ation takeover statutes. After the Edgar decision many lower courts struck
44. Only Virginia had a state takeover statute at the date the Williams Act became effec-
tive. VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (Repl. Vol. 1985). Following the enactment of the
Williams Act, 36 states passed takeover statutes in the next 15-year period. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (1982); see also Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 476 (1987) (anti-takeover
statutes created from the date of enactment for the Williams Act in 1968 to the Supreme Court
decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp. in 1982 constitute first generation statutes). For a listing of
the 36 first generation statutes, see Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation:
MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671 n.3 (1985).
45. Note, supra note 13, at 416 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, para. 137.54(A)




48. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57(A) (1979) (repealed 1983)).
49. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57(E) (1979) (repealed 1983)).
50. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
52. 457 U.S. at 646.
53. Id. at 640; see supra note 41.
54. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
55. Id. at 646. The Act applied to corporations that were not incorporated in Illinois and
that had their principal place of business in other states. The Court held that Illinois had no
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations. As a result, the Court stated
1988]
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down similar first generation statutes as being unconstitutional. 56
After Edgar states passed statutes to maintain regulation of takeovers
within state boundaries, which eliminated many of the features deemed un-
constitutional in Edgar.57 These new statutes became known as second gen-
eration statutes. 58 Most of these statutes were simply old laws the
legislatures revised to eliminate the problems of the statute labeled unconsti-
tutional in Edgar.59
The second generation statutes generally fall into five main divisions. The
first category contains the fair price statutes.6° These statutes address the
two-tier takeover bid. 61 An investor will often pay a high price in an initial
tender offer.6 2 If the offer is successful, the investor may then use the result-
ing newly acquired control to force the remaining shareholders to sell their
shares at a much lower price than the original tender offer price. 63 The fair
price statutes require a successful tender offeror either to obtain
supermajority approval (usually eighty percent), 64 or pay a fair price to the
that the burdens of the Act exceeded the local benefits and declared the Illinois Act unconsti-
tutional under the commerce clause. Id. at 645-46.
56. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey
statute violates supremacy clause); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279,
1286 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute violates both commerce clause and supremacy clause),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Em-
pire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 904-05 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri statute violates
both commerce clause and supremacy clause); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191, 193
(D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute violates both commerce clause and supremacy clause); Crane
Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 785-88, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania statute violates both
commerce clause and supremacy clause).
57. Statutes such as those in Hawaii, Indiana, and Ohio eliminate precommencement fil-
ings, hearings to determine the fairness of the offer, and state rights to deny the offer. HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 415-171 to -172 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Burns Supp.
1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985).
58. Note, supra note 13, at 417-26.
59. Pinto, supra note 44, at 478.
60. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1103 to
-1105 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396 to -.398 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:131-:134 (West Supp. 1987); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985
& Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988); MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -7 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (1985 Repl. Vol.);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp.
1987).
61. See generally Note, Second Step Transactions in Two- Tiered Takeovers: The Case for
State Regulation, 19 GA. L. REV. 343 (1985). The first step of a two-tier bid involves an
investor who makes a tender offer to purchase enough shares to possess a majority interest
(greater than 50% of the outstanding shares) in the target corporation. If the investor suc-
ceeds in acquiring a majority interest, he then merges the target corporation into his corpora-
tion. Now the investor implements the second step by forcing the minority stockholders to
accept cash or debt in exchange for their shares at a price substantially lower than the price
initially offered by the acquiring investor in the tender offer. Id. at 344-45.
62. Id. at 344 (often called the front-end bid).
63. Id. at 344-45 (this transaction is commonly referred to as a "freezeout"). For a gen-
eral discussion of freezeouts, see Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978).
64. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985). To obtain
supermajority approval under the Maryland statute, the board of directors must approve the
combination and the proposal must receive at least:
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remaining shareholders based on a statutory formula.65
The second category of second generation statutes is comprised of regis-
tration and disclosure statutes.66 These statutes require the tender offeror to
file a registration statement with a state commissioner at the time of the
offer.67 Most of the requirements parallel those required by the Williams
Act.68 In addition, the statutes generally require additional disclosure, in-
cluding sources of financing, future plans after the takeover, and an evalua-
tion of potential legal claims. 69 To this date, registration and disclosure
statutes have survived the constitutionality tests under both the supremacy
clause and the commerce clause.70
The third category of second generation takeover statutes encompasses
the director approval statutes.7 1 Director approval statutes prevent mergers
(1) 80 percent of the votes entitled to be cast by outstanding shares of voting
stock of the corporation, voting together as a single voting group; and
(2) Two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast by holders of voting stock other
than voting stock held by the interested stockholder who is (or whose affiliate is)
a party to the business combination or an affiliate or associate of the interested
shareholder, voting together as a single voting group.
Id. § 3-602.
65. Id. § 3-603(b). The general statutory formula is as follows:
(1) The aggregate amount.., to be received per share by holders of common
stock in such business combination is at least equal to the highest of the
following:
(i) The highest per share price... paid by the interested stockholder for any
shares of common stock ... or(ii) The market value per share of common stock.., on the announcement
date or on the determination date, whichever is higher; or
(iii) The price per share equal to the market value per share of common stock
... multiplied by the fraction of:
1. The highest per share ... price paid by the interested stockholder for any
shares of common stock..., over
2. The market value per share of common stock.., on the first day in such 2
year period on which the interested stockholder acquired any shares of common
stock.
Id.
66. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -11 (1985 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 80B.01-.13 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2418 to -2430 (1983);
TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 48-5-101 to -104 (Supp. 1987).
67. Pozen, The New Round of State Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89, 90(1987). These statutes avoid one serious pitfall of first generation statutes by not requiring
filing before the time of the offer. Id.
68. Note, supra note 13, at 424. For further discussion of parallel requirements under the
Williams Act, see supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
69. Pozen, supra note 67, at 90. These additional requirements exceed any SEC require-
ments for tender offers. Id.
70. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 1984). Although
the court found two provisions of the statute unconstitutional for vagueness, it upheld the
constitutionality of the Minnesota Corporate Takeovers Act on both supremacy clause and
commerce clause grounds. Id. But see L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 205, 209(6th Cir. 1985). The court upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan Take-Over Offers Act
on commerce clause grounds, but held that the Williams Act preempted the statute under the
supremacy clause. Id.
71. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (Bums Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 271A.396 to -
.398 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1988);




between investors and target corporations for a set number of years, usually
five, unless the target's board of directors approves the combination. 72 After
the set period, the investor must pay a fair price to all shareholders unless
the shareholders decide otherwise. 73 These statutes parallel control share
acquisition statutes to a large extent, except that the investor needs approval
from the target corporation's board of directors rather than from the share-
holders. 74 The Delaware Legislature recently passed a director approval
statute requiring approval of any transaction by an investor owning between
fifteen and eighty-five percent of the company's stock.7 5 Director approval
statutes possess many of the same conflicts with the supremacy clause and
commerce clause as do the control share acquisition statutes, but the courts
have yet to rule on the constitutionality of these statutes.76
The fourth category of second generation takeover statutes are the control
share cash-out statutes. 77 These statutes provide a unique set of rights for
the shareholders of a target corporation. Once an investor crosses a specified
ownership threshold, a shareholder may require the investor to purchase the
shareholder's stock at fair market value unless they agree to another price. 78
Shareholders who oppose the shift in control possess an option under the
statute to reduce or eliminate their interest in the corporation and receive a
fair price. 79 Although these statutes appear to meet the constitutional guide-
lines more closely than the other second generation statutes, the courts have
not ruled on their status.
The fifth category of second generation takeover statutes consists of the
control share acquisition statutes. After the Supreme Court recently upheld
the constitutionality of the Indiana control share statute, many states either
have passed or are considering control share legislation. Due to the recent
popularity of these statutes, an analysis of the various control share statutes
and a discussion of the controversy surrounding these statutes follows.
72. 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 868, 869 (June 12, 1987).
73. Id. at 869.
74. Pozen, supra note 67, at 94. For discussion of control share acquisition statutes, see
infra notes 80-150 and accompanying text.
75. Act effective Feb. 2, 1988, § 203, 66 Del. Laws 204 (to be codified at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203). The Delaware statute imposes a three-year moratorium on any business
combination as opposed to the typical five-year moratorium. Id; see Veasey & Finkalstein, The
Delaware Business Combinations State: Pin Opportunity for Reassessment, 16 SEc. REG. L.J.
157 (1988) (discusses suitability of Delaware statute).
76. For discussion of the validity of the New York director approval statute under both
the commerce clause and the supremacy clause, see Pinto, N. Y. Law, 8 Nat'l L. J., Feb. 24,
1986, at 1, col. 4
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 910 (Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 1409.1(c)(l)-(3), 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
78. Pozen, supra note 67, at 96. The investor crossing the established ownership thresh-
old must provide notice to all shareholders that he has crossed the ownership threshold. Id.
Shareholders may then exercise their right to require the investor to purchase their shares at




III. CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITION STATUTES
A. Second Generation Statutes
After the Edgar decision, six states created anti-takeover statutes designed
to discourage investors who purchased shares with the intent of acquiring
control of the corporation within that state.80 The states accomplished this
objective by withholding control of voting rights from any person who, after
acquisition of the shares, would significantly control the voting power of the
issuing public corporation.8 1 Generally, a purchase of stock qualifies as a
control share acquisition8 2 if after the purchase the investor holds more than
twenty percent of the corporation's stock that contains voting rights.8 3 All
second generation control share acquisition statutes apply only to domestic
corporations within that particular state.8 4 In addition, the issuing domestic
corporation must meet a threshold test. The usual requirements specify a
minimum number of total shareholders in the corporation, and mandate that
the principal place of business, principal office, or a substantial percentage of
the corporation's assets be within that state.8 5 Some of the states also re-
80. HAw REV. STAT. §§ 415-171 to -172 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11
(Bums Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.01 1(37)-(39), 302A.449(7), 302A.671 (West
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1
(Anderson 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25 (West Supp. 1987).
81. The number of shareholders necessary to qualify as a "issuing public corporation"
varies with individual state statutes. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1601(12) (Supp. 1988) ('Is-
suing public corporation' means a publicly held corporation which has at least fifty (50) share-
holders..."); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (Burns Supp. 1988) ('issuing public corporation'
means a corporation that has ... One hundred (100) or more shareholders..."); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 170.01(y) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (" 'Issuing public corporation ' means a do-
mestic corporation with fifty or more shareholders ... ").
82. The Indiana statute defines a "control share acquisition" as "the acquisition (directly
or indirectly) by any person of ownership of, or the power to direct the exercise of voting
power with respect to, issued and outstanding control shares." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-
2(a) (Bums Supp. 1988). The Indiana statute defines "control shares" as:
[S]hares that, except for this chapter, would have voting power with respect to
shares of an issuing public corporation that, when added to all other shares of
the issuing public corporation owned by a person or in respect to which that
person may exercise or' direct the exercise of voting power, would entitle that
person, immediately after acquisition of the shares ... to exercise or direct the
exercise of the voting power of the issuing public corporation in the election of
directors within any of the following ranges of voting power:
(1) One-fifth (1/5) or more but less than one-third (1/3) of all voting power.
(2) One-third (1/3) or more but less than a majority of all voting power.
(3) A majority or more of all voting power.
Id. § 23-1-42-1.
83. See Note, supra note 13, at 418; see also Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law.-
Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1066 (1986). Although
20% is the standard threshold for which a purchase of shares from an investor constitutes a
control share acquisition, other thresholds within these statutes do exist. Typically, if an inves-
tor's ownership interest surpasses either 20%, 33-1/3%, or 50%, his purchase creates a con-
trol share acquisition. For example, an investor currently owning a 17% interest must obtain
shareholder approval to obtain another 4% of the corporation's stock. Likewise, an investor
currently owning a 42% interest must obtain shareholder approval to obtain another 10% of
the corporation's stock. Id.
84. Note, supra note 13, at 418.
85. HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-171 (1985) (corporation must be incorporated in Hawaii
with at least 100 shareholders and have its principal place of business or substantial assets
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quire that a certain percentage of shareholders reside in that state,8 6 a cer-
tain percentage of the outstanding shares are owned by that state's
residents,8 7 or a certain minimum number of shareholders reside in that
state.
88
Other relevant features of control share acquisition statutes include auto-
matic application unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws provide
otherwise.8 9 Voting rights must be approved, usually by a majority of all
outstanding shares, excluding either interested shares90 or those shares bene-
ficially owned by the acquiring person.9 1 Most second generation anti-take-
over statutes define interested shares as those over which either the bidder,92
an officer of the issuer, 93 or an employee of the issuer who also serves as a
director of the issuer94 may directly or indirectly exercise the corporation's
voting power in the election of directors.95
A major issue regarding the, second generation statutes involves the
amount of notice the acquiring investor must give the target corporation.
Generally, an investor must file an acquiring person statement with the tar-
get corporation specifying the identity of the acquiring party or parties,96 the
number of shares owned by the acquiring group,97 and the financial backing
located in Hawaii); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(Y) (Anderson Supp. 1987)
(must be "a domestic corporation with fifty or more shareholders that has its principal place of
business, principal executive offices, or substantial assets within this state, and as to which no
valid close corporation agreement exists").
86. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a)(3)(A) (Bums Supp. 1988) (more than 10%
of the corporation's shareholders resident in Indiana); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(d)(i)
(1987 Supp.) (more than 10% of the corporation's shareholders resident in North Carolina).
87. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a)(3)(B) (Bums Supp. 1988) (Indiana residents
own at least 10% of the corporation's shares); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(d)(ii) (1987
Supp.) (North Carolina residents own at least 10% of the corporation's shares).
88. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a)(3)(C) (Bums Supp. 1988) (at least 10,000
shareholders resident in Indiana); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.01 1(39) (West Supp. 1988) (at
least 1,000 shareholders resident in Minnesota).
89. HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-172 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A) (Ander-
son 1985).
90. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(b)(1), (2) (Bums Supp. 1988).
91. HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-172(e)(1) (1985); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01
(1985) for a definition of a beneficial owner that:
[I]ncludes, but is not limited to, any person who directly or indirectly through
any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or
shares the power to vote or direct the voting of a security and the power to
dispose of, or direct the disposition of, the security ....
Id.
92. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-3(1) (Bums Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.01(CC)(1) (Anderson 1985).
93. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-3(2) (Bums Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.01(CC)(2) (Anderson 1985).
94. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-3(3) (Bums Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.01(CC)(3) (Anderson 1985).
95. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-3 (Bums Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.01(CC) (Anderson 1985).
96. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-172(c)(1) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.83.1(B)(1) (Anderson 1985).
97. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-172(c)(3) (1985) (includes all shares that the bidder
beneficially owns); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1(B)(3) (Anderson 1985) (includes all
shares that the acquiring person owns directly or indirectly).
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of the group.98 Upon delivery of the statement, the acquiring person or
group may request a special meeting of the shareholders to determine ap-
proval of voting rights for the acquiring person or group, as long as the
acquiring group agrees to pay the expenses of the meeting.99 Typically, the
special meeting to decide on voting rights must occur no later than fifty days
after receipt of the request.' °°
Some of these control share statutes provide a redemption feature that
allows the target corporation to redeem the acquiring person's stock.101 In-
diana's statute provides that a target corporation may redeem the acquiring
person's stock under two conditions. First, if the acquiring person does not
file an acquiring person statement within sixty days after the last purchase of
target company shares, the statute allows the target corporation to buy back
the acquiring person's shares.102 Second, if the shareholders reject full vot-
ing rights to the acquiring person or group, then the statute allows the target
corporation to redeem the acquiring group's shares. 103
The last provision present in several second generation statutes involves
the rights of the other remaining shareholders after a successful control
share acquisition. 104 If the acquiring person receives authorization of voting
rights, dissenting shareholders may receive the highest price the purchaser
paid for the controlling interest. 105 The denial of voting rights and the un-
reasonable delay involved in these second generation control share statutes
serve to effectively eliminate most bidders' chances of obtaining control of a
corporation.
A brief examination of second generation control share acquisition stat-
utes and their track records in the courts provides an insight into the contro-
versy between the states and the federal government with regard to these
statutes. Ohio enacted the initial second generation control share statute in
98. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-172(c)(5) (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.83.1(B)(6) (Anderson 1985). The statement must set forth: "Representations of the
acquiring person .... that the proposed control share acquisition, if consummated, will not be
contrary to law, and that the acquiring person has the financial capacity to make the proposed
control share acquisition." Id.
99. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7(a) (Bums Supp. 1988) (acquirer must pay corpora-
tion's expenses within 10 days after the special meeting).
100. Id. § 23-1-42-7(b). The acquiring person can request in writing when he delivers the
statement that he does not want the shareholders to hold the special meeting for at least 30
days. Id. § 23-1-42-7(d). The corporation then may not hold the meeting earlier than 30 days
after receipt of the statement. Id.
101. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-172(b) (1985) (corporation has option to call shares for
redemption either at acquisition price or book value per share); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
1-42-10(a) (Bums Supp. 1988) (corporation may redeem shares only at fair value).
102. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10(a) (Bums Supp. 1988) (if corporation redeems shares,
it must do so at fair market value).
103. Id. § 23-1-42-10(b).
104. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.84, .85 (Anderson 1985) (shareholders opposing
shift in control may receive from corporation cash value of shares if they deliver written de-
mand for payment within 10 days of vote approving control share acquisition); see also IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 l(b) (Bums Supp. 1988) (after granting corporation approval to con-
trol share acquisition, corporation must provide notice to all shareholders advising them of
control share acquisition and their right to receive fair value of their shares if they so desire).
105. IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-42-11(c) (Bums Supp. 1988).
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1982, approximately five months after the Edgar decision. 10 6 The Ohio stat-
ute required that the corporation have fifty shareholders and either that the
principal place of business be in Ohio or that the target corporation maintain
substantial assets within Ohio.' 07 The statute also required approval of vot-
ing rights by a majority of disinterested shareholders. 108 In Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman 1o9 the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Ohio statute violated
both the supremacy clause and the commerce clause. 110 The court held that
the resulting unreasonable delay to the bidder conflicted with the objectives
of the Williams Act. 111 The court of appeals agreed with the district court,
which stated that the Ohio act strongly favored incumbent management
through the requirement of a shareholder vote.' 12
The scope of Missouri's statute, enacted in 1984, exceeded that of Ohio by
requiring a vote of not only a majority, but two-thirds of all outstanding
shares, excluding interested shares.1 13 In Icahn v. Blunt 114 a United States
District Court declared the Missouri Control Share Acquisition Statute inva-
lid due to violations of both the commerce and supremacy clauses. 115 The
court's reasons were similar to those the Sixth Circuit used to strike down
the Ohio statute. 116 The Missouri statute, however, went further in its pro-
visions by mandating that the offeror receive approval from the shareholders
before the offeror could make the acquisition. 117 By requiring the approval
of the shareholders prior to commencement of the offer, the statute made it
virtually impossible to comply with the provisions of the Williams Act,
which require a tender offeror to commence his offer within five days after
announcement of the offer.' 18 As a result, the court stated that the statute
violated the supremacy clause.' 19
Minnesota followed Missouri in implementing a control share acquisition
statute in 1984.120 The Minnesota statute resembled the Missouri law in
106. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985). The statute became effective
Nov. 19, 1982. Id.
107. Id. § 1701.01.
108. Id. § 1701.83.1(E)(1).
109. 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987). The Supreme Court
vacated the Sixth Circuit's ruling due to the reversal of CTS. Id. The Sixth Circuit subse-
quently remanded the case to the district court to decide whether an intervening merger be-
tween the parties renders the case moot and to reconsider the constitutionality of the Ohio
statute in light of CTS. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 923 (June 17, 1988).
110. 796 F.2d at 139.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 756 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
The district judge stated that the Act "impermissibly tips the scales in favor of incumbent
management by requiring a shareholder vote." Id.
113. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1407 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.407.5).
114. 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
115. Id. at 1414-20.
116. Id.; Fleet Aerospace Corp., 796 F.2d at 139.
117. 612 F. Supp. at 1419 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407.2 (1984), repealed by Act
approved August 11, 1987, No. 349, § A, 1987 Mo. Legis. Serv. 449 (Vernon)).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1988). This SEC regulation implements § 13 of the Williams
Act.
119. Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1420.
120. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.011(37)-(39), 302A.449(7), 302A.671 (West 1985).
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that it required the offeror to obtain approval of the shareholders before
commencement of the offer.121 In APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen
Air, Inc. 122 a United States District Court declared the Minnesota statute
invalid because it violated the commerce clause. 12 3 The court based its deci-
sion on three provisions of the statute. First, since the statute applied to
non-Minnesota residents as well as to Minnesota residents, the court held
that the statute unreasonably burdened interstate commerce based on the
balancing test used in Pike. 124 Second, the court questioned the state's claim
that the statute protected the business climate in Minnesota.' 25 This aspect
of the statute assumed that acquisitions harm corporations, when in fact that
may not be true.' 2 6 Third, the court ruled the internal affairs doctrine inap-
plicable because tender offers involve dealings with third parties and share-
holders, not just those already within the corporation. 27
Hawaii passed the next second generation control share acquisition stat-
ute.' 2 8 This statute prevented a buyer from purchasing control shares if ex-
isting shareholders failed to approve the purchase, even if all existing
shareholders were nonresidents of Hawaii.' 2 9 The only requirement neces-
sary for a corporation to qualify under the statute was that it have a mini-
mum of one hundred shareholders and have either its principal place of
business or substantial assets in Hawaii.' 30  In Terry v. Yamashita '3' a
United States District Court declared the Hawaii statute unconstitutional on
commerce clause grounds.' 32 The court used the Pike analysis and deter-
mined that the statute's burdens exceeded its benefits. 133 In addition, the
court criticized the unlimited delay the statute provided for incumbent man-
agement as conflicting with the Williams Act. 134
Wisconsin's second generation statute attempts to cushion the blow upon
voting rights imposed by the other statutes by giving the acquiring group ten
percent of the voting power of any shares they own in excess of twenty per-
cent. 3 This statute makes a token effort to satisfy acquiring persons and
the courts. To date no cases have addressed this statute's constitutionality.
Indiana adopted the last of the second generation statutes.' 36 This statute
121. Id. § 302A.449(7).
122. 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985).
123. Id. at 1225.
124. Id. For balancing test, see supra note 41.
125. 622 F. Supp. at 1223.
126. Id.; see infra note 217.
127. 622 F. Supp. at 1223-24. The internal affairs doctrine expresses the view that only one
state should govern a corporation's internal affairs. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645(1982). Internal affairs constitute matters between the corporation and its officers, directors,
and shareholders. Id.
128. HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-171 to -172 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
129. See id. § 415-171.
130. Id.
131. 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986).
132. Id. at 165.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 168.
135. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9)(a) (West Supp. 1987).
136. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1988).
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followed the form of the other control share acquisition statutes, but re-
stricted the acquiring party the least and avoided some of the pitfalls of the
other statutes. In an attempt to comply with the commerce clause, the Indi-
ana statute required either that more than ten percent of the corporation's
shareholders reside in Indiana, 137 that Indiana residents own more than ten
percent of its shares, 138 or that ten thousand shareholders reside in Indi-
ana. 139 In addition, drafters of the statute attempted to avoid problems with
the Williams Act by not requiring advance notice to the target corporation
or shareholder approval before commencement of the tender offer. 14 Other-
wise the statute contained all of the basic provisions of the other control
share acquisition statutes such as requiring an acquiring person state-
ment, 141 allowing a fifty-day lag for approval of voting rights, 42 and includ-
ing both redemption provisions 143 and dissenting shareholder rights.144 In
Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. 145 a United States District Court
ruled that Indiana's statute failed to meet the test of constitutionality under
either the commerce clause or the supremacy clause. 146 The court held that
state legislation that upsets the neutral balance struck by the Williams Act
between the investor, incumbent management, and the takeover bidder is
invalid under the supremacy clause. 147 In addition, the court decided that
the burden placed on interstate commerce exceeded the local benefits pro-
vided by the statute. 48 On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision for the same reasons, emphasizing the positive aspects. a
takeover can potentially have on a corporation. 149  On certiorari the
Supreme Court ruled for the first time on the constitutionality of second
generation control share acquisition statutes. 150
B. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
Before the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of control share
acquisition statutes in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 151 every
lower court that faced these second generation statutes declared them un-
constitutional.152 Only the Wisconsin statute stood unchallenged. 5 3 Each
137. Id. § 23-1-42-4(3)(A).
138. Id. § 23-1-42-4(3)(B).
139. Id. § 23-1-42-4(3)(C).
140. This avoided the conflicts with the Williams Act found in the Missouri and Minnesota
statutes. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
145. 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
146. Id. at 399-400, 406.
147. Id. at 397.
148. Id. at 405-06.
149. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986). For a discussion
on the potentially positive aspects of takeovers, see id. at 253-55.
150. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 258, 93 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1986).
151. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1987).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 106-50.
153. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.25 (West Supp. 1987).
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court applied the same basic reasoning in reaching its decision. Each court
ruled that the excessive burdens on interstate commerce exceeded the local
benefits of the statute.154 The majority of these decisions also held that the
statutes caused unreasonable delay and frustrated the objectives of the Wil-
liams Act, 155 thereby violating the supremacy clause. 156 Both lower courts
in the CTS case followed this reasoning in analyzing the Indiana statute. 157
The Supreme Court shocked many with its analysis in reversing the deci-
sion of the lower courts in a six-to-three decision and declaring the Indiana
statute valid. 158 The Court concluded that the statute violated neither the
supremacy clause nor the commerce clause. 159 The Court decided that a
company could comply with both the Williams Act and the Indiana stat-
ute. 160 The Court further held that the Indiana statute did not frustrate the
purposes of the Williams Act. ' 6 ' The Court explained that the Indiana stat-
ute even passed the test of the plurality opinion in Edgar. 62 The Court
stated that the statute successfully placed current shareholders on an equal
footing with the tender offeror, thereby furthering the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act. ' 63 In addition, the Court expressed its opinion that the vesting of
voting rights within fifty days did not present an unreasonable delay to the
bidder. 164
The Court also declared that the statute satisfied the commerce clause by
determining that the effect on interstate commerce would be remote, while
the state's interest in protecting shareholders would be great.165 The Court
explained that since the statute had the same effect on tender offers whether
the bidder was a nonresident or a resident, the statute did not violate the
commerce clause. 166 In addition, the Court concluded that the statute
would not result in inconsistent regulation of tender offers by different
states. 167 The Court closed by expressing the view that even if the statute
discouraged many bidders, the statute would still not violate the commerce
clause because each bidder still had the opportunity to purchase shares in
154. The courts used the balancing test found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970). For further discussion, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
158. See, Langevoort, supra note 43, at 110 (Court surprisingly failed to address the true
intent of Indiana statute, protection of local managers and economy).
159. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67, 88
(1987).
160. Id. at 1644, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 78.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1645-47, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 80-83.
163. Id. at 1645-46, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 80. The Senate Report stated the intent of the Wil-
liams Act and expressed the purpose as "plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the take-
over bidder." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811).
164. 107 S. Ct. at 1647, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 82.
165. Id. at 1652, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 88.
166. Id. at 1648-49, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 84.
167. Id. at 1649, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 84-85. The statute applies only to Indiana corporations,
unless the corporation amends its articles of incorporation or bylaws to opt out of the statute.




The dissenting opinion, written by Justice White, in which Justices Black-
mun and Stevens joined, presented three arguments.1 69 First, the statute
prevented minority shareholders from selling their stock when in many cases
selling would have been in their better interests. 170 Second, other states will
follow Indiana's lead, which will substantially burden the interstate mar-
ket. 171 Third, the statute violated the intent of the commerce clause by in-
hibiting interstate commerce. 172 As a result, the dissent argued that the
Court should have declared the Indiana statute unconstitutional under both
the supremacy clause and the commerce clause.' 73
C. Third Generation Statutes
After the Supreme Court reversed the long trend of lower courts that in-
validated second generation statutes, 174 several states amended their statutes
to reflect the provisions of the Indiana statute. 75 Numerous other states
took the Supreme Court's decision as a carte blanche invitation to create
control share acquisition statutes. 176 A number of states enacted statutes
that strongly resembled Indiana's statute. Statutes in Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Utah
all look like the Indiana statute.177 Some of these statutes, however, reach
168. Id. at 1652, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 88.
169. Id. at 1653-56, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 90-93.
170. Id. at 1654-55, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 90-92.
171. Id. Justice White states with regard to the impact of the Indiana statute, "The major-
ity sees the trees but not the forest." Id. at 1655, 95 L. Ed. at 92.
172. Id. at 1655-56, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 92-93.
173. Id. at 1653-54, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 90.
174. Id. at 1652, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 88.
175. Minnesota, Act effective June 1, 1987, ch. 1, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., 1st Spec.
Sess. 911 (West) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01, 302A.01 1, 302A.251,
302A.255, 302A.433, 302A.553, 302A.671, 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988)); Missouri, Act ap-
proved Aug. 11, 1987, No. 349, § A, 1987 Mo. Legis. Serv. 449 (Vernon) (codified as amended
at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, 351.407 (West Supp. 1988)).
176. Arizona, Act approved July 22, 1987, ch. 3, 1987 Ariz. Legis. Serv., 3d Spec. Sess. 32
(West) (codified as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-028, 10-1201 to -1204, 10-1211
to -1217, 10-1221 to -1223 (Supp. 1987)); Florida, Act effective July 2, 1987, ch. 87-257, 1987
Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 517 (West) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.108 to -. 110,
607.244, 607.247 (West Supp. 1988)); Idaho, Control Share Acquisition Act, ch. 84, § 2, 1988
Idaho Sess. Laws 147 (codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1601 to -1614 (Supp. 1988)); Louisiana,
Act effective June 11, 1987, No. 62, § 1, 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 20 (West) (codified as
amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135-:140.2, 12:51(C), 12:75(A) (West Supp. 1988));
Massachusetts, Act approved July 21, 1987, ch. 272, 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 200 (Law.
Co-op.) (codified as amended at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110D, §§ 1-8 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1988)); Nevada, Act approved June 6, 1987, ch. 327, 1987 Nev. Stat. 755 (codified at NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 78.378 -.3793 (1987)); North Carolina, The North Carolina Control Share Ac-
quisition Act, ch. 182, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 48 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90
to -98 (1987 Supp.)); Oklahoma, Act effective June 24, 1987, ch. 146, 1987 Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. 639 (West) (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1988));
Utah, Control Share Acquisitions Act (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to -12 (1988
Supp.)). But see Delaware, Act effective Feb. 2, 1988, § 203, 66 Del. Laws 204 (to be codified
at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203) (Delaware elected to implement director approval statute
instead of control share acquisition statute).
177. See supra notes 175-76.
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beyond the scope of the Indiana statute.
In Nevada the statute applies to domestic corporations with two hundred
or more shareholders when at least one hundred shareholders are residents
of Nevada. 178 These corporations must do business in Nevada directly or
through an affiliated corporation. 179 This minimum threshold test means
that a corporation with one hundred thousand shareholders that only does
business indirectly through an affiliated corporation and only has one hun-
dred shareholders who are residents of Nevada would fall under the Nevada
statute. As a result the Nevada statute would subject ninety-nine thousand,
nine hundred nonresident shareholders to its provisions. These provisions
do not ensure a significant percentage or number of resident shareholders
and clearly exceed the provisions of the Indiana statute. 80
The North Carolina statute goes beyond the Indiana statute by subjecting
foreign corporations to the provisions of the statute.' 8 ' The statute covers a
foreign corporation if it has more than forty percent of its fixed assets lo-
cated in the United States in North Carolina, 8 2 and more than forty percent
of the company's United States' employees are residents of North Caro-
lina.'8 3 In addition, the corporation must have five hundred or more share-
holders, 184 its principal place of business or principal office within North
Carolina,8 5 and either ten percent of the shareholders residing in North
Carolina' 86 or more than ten percent of its shares owned by residents of
North Carolina.187 Furthermore, the North Carolina statute contains an in-
consistent-regulation provision. 188 If a foreign corporation organizes in any
state whose law is expressly inconsistent with the North Carolina provisions,
the North Carolina provisions yield to the extent necessary to resolve incon-
sistencies.' 89 The provisions still allow a foreign corporation whose state's
law is silent on an area to be subject to North Carolina's statute. 190
In Minnesota the state legislature reacted to the plea of a local corporation
that was the subject of a hostile takeover bid. 19 The legislature responded
by amending its existing control share acquisition statute. 192 The amended
178. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3788(1) (1987).
179. Id. § 78.3788(2).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(a)(ii) (1987 Supp.).
182. Id. § 55-90(b)(5)(a)(ii)(A).
183. Id. § 55-90(b)(5)(a)(ii)(B).
184. Id. § 55-90(b)(5)(b).
185. Id. § 55-90(b)(5)(c).
186. Id. § 55-90(b)(5)(d)(i).
187. Id. § 55-90(b)(5)(d)(ii).
188. Id. § 55-96.
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-96 (1987 Supp.).
190. Id. The Massachusetts statute also includes this inconsistent-regulation provision.
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 1 10E, § 6 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
191. Rose, Dayton Hudson Stake Acquired By Dart Group, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 3,
col. 1.
192. Act effective June 1, 1987, ch. 1, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., 1st Spec. Sess. 911
(West) (amending MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01, 302A.011, 302A.251, 302A.255, 302A.433,
302A.553, 302A.671, 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988)); see also Kilman, Dayton Hudson Expected
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statute follows Indiana's model,193 but has one major provision that exceeds
the Indiana statute. The Minnesota statute restricts for five years an ac-
quirer's right to sell the assets of an acquired company to pay takeover-
related costs.194 This provision steps well beyond the Indiana statute. Other
unique aspects of this statute include the prohibition of golden parachutes 95
and greenmail. 196 This statute also imposes a fiduciary duty on the directors
to consider employees, customers, suppliers, the community, and the econ-
omy of the state. 197
The Oklahoma statute is almost identical to the Indiana statute. 198 Ironi-
cally, however, this statute has received the first constitutional challenge to a
third generation statute. In TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp. 199 a U.S.
district court held the Oklahoma control share acquisition statute unconsti-
tutional on commerce clause grounds.2°° The plaintiff, TLX, initiated a
tender offer to acquire majority interest in defendant Telex Corp., a Dela-
ware corporation whose principal place of business was in Oklahoma.
The court distinguished TLX from the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in
CTS by noting that the Indiana statute upheld in CTS applied only to Indi-
ana corporations, whereas the Oklahoma statute potentially applied to for-
eign corporations as well as Oklahoma corporations.20' Under the
Oklahoma statute, a tender offeror, such as TLX, making a bid for a com-
pany such as Telex, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of busi-
ness was Oklahoma, has no idea which state law governs the voting rights of
the target corporation. Accordingly, the TLX court ruled that the statute, as
applied to foreign corporations such as Telex, violated the commerce clause
due to its unacceptable risk of inconsistent regulations by the states.202 In
addition, the district court held the statute in violation of the commerce
clause because the benefits of protecting Oklahoma shareholders of Telex,
between ten and twenty percent of Telex shareholders, did not exceed the
burdens that the statute placed on the nonresident shareholders of a nonresi-
dent corporation. 20 3 This case seems to indicate that in the future courts
to Get Minnesota's Aid, Wall St. J., June 23, 1987, at 12, col. 1 (within days Minnesota Legisla-
ture amends anti-takeover statute to aid resident corporation).
193. For a discussion of Indiana's statute, see supra text accompanying notes 136-44.
194. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673(l)(a) (West Supp. 1988).
195. Id. § 302A.255(3). Golden parachutes furnish cash settlements to top-level managers
who have been discharged without cause after a takeover or whose status declines as a result of
the takeover. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 254 (3d ed. 1983).
These agreements usually provide for cash payments for several years. Id.
196. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.553(3) (West Supp. 1988). Greenmail amounts to an
agreement between the hostile bidder and the target corporation by which the target corpora-
tion buys back the hostile bidder's shares at a substantial premium over what the bidder paid
for the shares. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 13.6.1 (1986). In return the bidder agrees to
stop his takeover attempt. Id.
197. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1988).
198. Act effective June 24, 1987, ch. 146, 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 639 (West) (codified
at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1988)).
199. 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
200. Id. at 1033.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1031.
203. Id. at 1032.
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may lean toward a strict interpretation of the CTS decision in ruling on the
constitutionality of other generation statutes.
The question remaining is whether the other third generation statutes,
which exceed the bounds of the Indiana statute, pass the test of constitution-
ality. Challenges to these new control share acquisition statutes undoubt-
edly will occur. States will continue to press the courts on this issue and the
conflict between the federal government and the states for priority of regula-
tion will continue.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
The validity and extent of state control share acquisition statutes remain
unresolved. The two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with this
area, Edgar2°4 and CTS,205 have provided guidance in how far states can go
before their statutes conflict with federal laws. A gray area still exists, how-
ever, between the guidelines for constitutionality provided by these two
cases. The Supreme Court has indicated that both the states and the federal
government play a role in the regulation of corporate takeovers. 206 The
problem centers on the absence of set standards for the states to follow to
ensure consistency and constitutionality.
Defining the role that the states should play in regulating takeovers
presents a similar dilemma. For many years the federal government regu-
lated stock transactions through the Williams Act while the states regulated
corporate bylaws and charters. This division of authority rests upon the
practical observation that securities are bought and sold by and for people
nationwide, not just by residents of the state where a corporation is organ-
ized.207 The states' regulation of the exchange of securities would result in
fifty different sets of rules governing corporate acquisitions and would create
utter chaos. States argue that their goal is shareholder protection, but their
true intent appears to consist of upholding the states' tax base and appeasing
their constituents affected by successful bids (management of local corpora-
tions, employees, influential citizens benefiting from local companies' pres-
ence). 20 8 This smokescreen provides the states a defense and avoids the real
issue the courts should address: transfer of economic strength from local
interests and the states' right to impose legislation promoting protection-
ism. 20 9 States generally should continue to regulate the internal affairs of
corporations chartered in their state. The one exception should be issues
regarding a change in corporate control.210 Because of their protectionist
204. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
205. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1987).
206. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 78.
207. The Supreme Court demonstrated this concern regarding the role of the states in Ed-
gar: "While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders." 457 U.S. at 644.
208. Langevoort, supra note 43, at 116-17.
209. Id. at 117.
210. See Thompson, Defining the Federal and State Realms of Tender Offer Regulation, 64
WASH. U.L.Q. 1057, 1090-91 (1986) (market for corporate control provides an exception to
state regulation of corporations).
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attitude, states negatively impact our free market system by regulating the
market for corporate control.2 11 Federal legislators sit in a better position to
provide a less biased approach than the states in the market for corporate
control. The exchange of securities should remain the province of federal
law to ensure consistency and fairness in the regulation of the national secur-
ities market.
In the recent Supreme Court decision in CTS the majority failed to ad-
dress adequately two basic concerns regarding control share acquisition stat-
utes. First, the majority failed to consider fully the situation where an
individual investor disagrees with the majority of shareholders who rejected
a tender offer by refusing to grant voting rights.2 12 This investor may not
sell his stock at a premium to the tender offeror if he now desires. The
Supreme Court should address this fundamental problem at its next hearing
of the issue. An individual shareholder has the opportunity to purchase
ownership rights in a corporation by purchasing stock at an acceptable price.
This same individual shareholder should be able to sell his stock when he
desires.2 13 The majority apparently failed to consider this type of investor
when it stated that the statute did not impose a significant burden on inter-
state commerce.214 As a basic proposition, states should not be allowed to
design laws that prevent the free exchange of shares in a company.2 15 Scien-
tific evidence clearly indicates that state takeover regulation negatively im-
pacts the returns for both bidders and target firms' shareholders. 21 6
Allowing states to protect incumbent management imposes a great loss on
211. See id.
212. In the dissenting opinion, Justice White stated, "The problem with the approach the
majority adopts today is that it equates protection of individual investors, the focus of the
Williams Act, with the protection of shareholders as a group." CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1654, 95 L.
Ed. 2d at 90.
213. In his dissenting opinion in CTS, Justice White articulated his concern for the individ-
ual investor's right to sell his stock as follows: "But it is clear to me that Indiana's scheme
conflicts with the Williams Act's careful balance which was intended to protect individual
investors and permit them to decide whether it is in their best interests to tender their stock."
Id. at 1654, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 91; see also Simmons, In defense of the 'corporate raider,' Dallas
Morning News, July 28, 1987, at ID, col. 3, 13D, col. 2 (article represents view of corporate
investor).
214. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 85.
215. In CTS the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission joined as
amicus curiae, and argued that the Indiana statute
[I]s written as a restraint on the transferability of voting rights in specified trans-
actions, and it could not be written in any other way without changing its mean-
ing. Since the restraint on the transfer of voting rights is a restraint on the
transfer of shares, the Indiana Chapter, like the Illinois Act [in MITE], restrains
"transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party."
107 S. Ct. at 1655, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 92 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice
White concurred with this view in the dissenting opinion. Id.
216. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 5, 28 (1983). The evidence demonstrates that although both bidders and target
shareholders receive positive abnormal returns as a result of a tender offer, offers subject to
state takeover regulations produced less favorable returns than did offers not subject to the
state regulations. Id. In contrast, implementation of the Williams Act had a positive impact
on the returns of target firm shareholders subject to a tender offer. Id. For further discussion
of the economic impact of takeover regulations, see Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of
Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcON. 371 (1980).
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the American public of its long standing principles of a free market system,
and as a result our nation's economy suffers.2 17
The second area the majority failed to consider involves the redemption
provision contained in most of the control share statutes. In the Indiana
statute the issuing public corporation may redeem stock that was purchased
without subsequently filing an acquiring person statement if the tender of-
feror had not filed a statement within sixty days after the last acquisition of
control shares. 2 18 In addition, the corporation may also redeem all control
shares not given full voting rights by the shareholders. 2 19 In the eyes of
investors, this provision constitutes private scrutiny of shareholders. 220 To
provide a corporation the right to prevent a shareholder from maintaining
an ownership interest in the company when he has done absolutely nothing
detrimental to the issuing corporation is clearly inequitable and again a vio-
lation of the free market system.
The only long-term solution to the applicability of these statutes requires
legislation at the federal level that would supersede conflicting state takeover
regulation. As Justice White emphasized in the dissenting opinion in CTS,
numerous other states will follow Indiana's lead and create similar statutes,
which will substantially burden the interstate market. 22 1 Allowing each state
to create a unique set of standards for its corporations imposes an unreason-
able burden on the investors. Congress must provide a uniform standard for
the states to follow that clarifies the ambiguities in determining the balance
between target management, the shareholder, and the bidder. Congress
should amend the Williams Act to clarify its ambiguities in light of the re-
cent takeover developments that Congress did not foresee when drafting the
Act.222
The amended statute should provide more precise time and disclosure re-
quirements while keeping in mind the original purpose of the Act, share-
holder protection. The legislation should amend section 13(d) of the 1934
217. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 216, at 28. The evidence indicates that both bidders
and targets receive positive abnormal returns as a result of a successful tender offer. Id. at 22.
The study also suggests that target firms receive positive abnormal returns regardless of
whether the tender offeror succeeds in his takeover bid as long as the target of an unsuccessful
tender offer receives another tender offer within the following two years. Id. at 15-16. The
study in general concludes that takeovers are value-creating transactions. Id. at 22.
218. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-142-10(a) (Burns Supp. 1988). The issuing public corporation
must, however, authorize redemption of control shares in its articles of incorporation or by-
laws before occurrence of the control share acquisition. Id..
219. Id. § 23-1-42-10(b).
220. Simmons, supra note 213, col. 2. The Indiana statute provides a redemption feature
that "would sanction the private condemnation of stock." Id.
221. 107 S. Ct. at 1654, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 90.
222. Langevoort, supra note 43, at 113. Congress enacted the Williams Act in 1968. Take-
over activity increased dramatically in the early 1970s and continued to increase through the
1980s. The Williams Act does not carry the sophistication necessary to cover the problems
inherent in today's takeover activity. This result transfers to the courts the role of interpreting
the intent of a general provision into specific situations. See Boyer, Federalism and Corpora-
tion Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1056-57
(1986); see also Steinberg, State Law Developments.- Federal Preemption of State Antitakeover
Statutes, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 80 (1988) (advocates federal reemption of state statutes).
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Act by reducing from ten days to five days the time period within which the
investor who has purchased more than five percent of the corporation's stock
must report the acquisition through filings with the SEC, the issuer, and the
securities exchanges. The amendment should require the purchaser to an-
nounce publicly through a national medium the acquisition within twenty-
four hours of the acquisition. The public announcement should identify the
purchaser, the number of shares acquired, and the nature of ownership (di-
rect or indirect). The measure should direct the purchaser to file and pub-
licly announce any material amendments to the original statement by the
end of trading on the exchanges the following business day. These specific
disclosure requirements would provide more relevant information to both
the corporation's shareholders and management in a timely manner, while
minimizing the imposition on the purchaser.
Congress also should amend the Williams Act to prohibit both green-
mail 223 and golden parachutes. 224 In addition, Congress should authorize
the SEC to impose appropriate civil penalties for violations of section 13(d)
as they have under section 21(d) of the 1934 Act for insider trading viola-
tions.225 The measure also should require shareholder approval for imple-
mentation of defense mechanisms such as poison pill plans. 226
With regard to the role of the states, Congress should add a provision to
the 1934 Act prohibiting certain restrictions on voting rights and the re-
demption provisions found in control share acquisition statutes. The addi-
tions should supersede conflicting state law regarding takeovers. The new
section of the 1934 Act, section 36, might resemble the following:
Sec. 36. (a) The Congress declares that the continued regulation by
the several States of matters involving the internal affairs of governance
of corporations organized under the respective laws of such States is in
the public interest, except when such affairs involve a potential change
in control of the corporation. The internal affairs or governance of cor-
porations shall be subject to regulation by the laws of the State under
which each such corporation is organized, except when such regulations
involve a potential change in control of the corporation.
(b) Subject to SEC Rule 19c-4,227 issuers of securities registered pur-
suant to section 12 of this Act shall not restrict or nullify the voting
rights of unaffilated holders of common shares of the issuer in any way.
(c) Redemption of common shares of securities by the issuing corpo-
ration is prohibited, unless agreed to by both the beneficial owner of the
common shares and the issuing corporation.
223. See supra note 196.
224. See supra note 195.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. I 1984).
226. For a discussion of poison pill defenses, see Herzel & Shapiro, The Changing Fortunes
of Takeover Defenses, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 116, 121-29 (1987); see also Anti-Takeover movesface
new challenges, Dallas Times Herald, June 26, 1988, § D (Business), at 1, col. 3 (institutional
investors and legislators advocate shareholder approval requirement for rights plan).
227. See Exchange Act Release Nos. 25891 & 25891A, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84, 247,
at 89,208 (July 7 & 13, 1988) (rule prohibits issuers from taking action which nullifies, re-
stricts, or disparately reduces per share voting rights of common stock shareholders). This
rule is commmonly referred to as the one-share, one-vote rule.
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(d) Any provisions contained in this section, or sections 13 or 14 of
this Act or any rules or regulations thereunder shall invalidate and su-
persede any conflicting law enacted by any State regulating the market
for corporate control. 228
By implementing the foregoing proposal, courts would not have to con-
tinue evaluating the constitutionality of each and every state control share
acquisition statute that appears. Specific federal legislation promoting free
transferability of shares, while ensuring adequate disclosure, will eliminate
confusion and ambiguity for the shareholder, incumbent management, and
the bidder.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate takeovers have become an integral part of our nation's econ-
omy. Investors on both sides typically reap large profits. Entrenched man-
agement stands as the only loser. As a result, managements of large
corporations persuade state legislatures to establish roadblocks in the form
of takeover legislation. The most recent wave of legislation restricts the vot-
ing rights of an investor who purchases a significant percentage of the corpo-
ration's voting- shares unless the investor receives a majority of the
shareholders' approval. Many of the statutes restrict the free transferability
of share ownership and provide for redemption of the issuing corporation's
stock. Congress should create legislation designed to clarify ambiguities in
the Williams Act and to promote enforcement of the commerce clause. Im-
plementation of federal legislation would provide a uniform standard under
which investors, management, and bidders could operate fairly and
effectively.
228. Compare this proposal with H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2540
(1987) (bill introduced by Rep. Dingell to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
that places extensive burdens on bidders) and S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG REC.
7601 (1987) (bill introduced by Sen. Proxmire to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs further restricting bidders and promoting state anti-takeover statutes).
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